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ANTITRUST LAW IN THE COMMON MARKET
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY AGREEMENTS
STEPHEN P. LADAS*
It is proposed in this paper to discuss only the incidence of the
Rules Governing Competition of the Treaty of Rome,' and the imple-
menting Regulations, on industrial property. To this end, it is neces-
sary to first view the policies of the Common Market in the context
of which the Treaty provisions were adopted and are to be interpreted;
then to give a brief analysis of the provisions in question; and lastly,
to suggest their application to industrial property agreements and the
procedure established by the Regulations.
Part One of the Treaty, which establishes the governing principles
of and for the Community, specifies in article 3 the principal activities
of the Community for the accomplishment of its task and lists, in a
catalog of eleven programmatic items, the following two:
(f) the establishment of a system which safeguards the compe-
tition within the Common Market against adulterations; ...
(h) the harmonization of the provisions of national laws to the
extent required for the orderly functioning of the Common
Market; . . .
The broad terms of these provisions make it clear that one of the
basic objectives of the Common Market is the achievement of a market
order which is free from unduly restrictive practices whether imposed
by government or initiated by private action.
In the six countries of the Common Market, national antitrust
legislation was certainly not uniform. Indeed, only Germany, where
the Act of 1957 against Restrictions of Competition certainly exhibits
American influence, has a complete antitrust law. The Dutch legis-
lation is an instrument to regulate economic trends, of neutral rather
than prohibitive character. The French law prohibits particular prac-
tices only, such as price fixing, refusal to sell or to perform a service,
discriminatory practices and ententes which prevent free competition
or involve illegal speculation. There was no Belgian antitrust law,
and the recent legislation enacted in 1960 looks only to abuses of
* Of the firm of Langner, Parry, Card & Langner, New York City.
' Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, signed March 25, 1957,
effective January 1, 1958. Part Three, title I, chapter 1 of the Treaty contains arts. 85
to 94 and is entitled "Rules Governing Competition."
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monopolistic market position. No legislation on the subject exists in
Luxemburg, and a law is only now in preparation in Italy.2
There has been no publication of the actual minutes or drafts of
the Treaty provisions, which led to their adoption, to guide us in under-
standing their objectives. But it is clear that the framers of the Treaty
had in mind that they must have a common supra-national law on
restrictions of competition. Their object was to establish a single
unified market analogous to a national market, and to accomplish an
interpenetration of productive factors and free movement of goods.
This appeared so important that the Treaty in this domain did
not provide, as in other aspects of community life, for mere basic
principles leaving the national legislator to resolve their application
by national law, nor for mere harmonization of the law through sepa-
rate arrangements. Instead, a full body of antitrust law was included
in the Treaty, and its implementation and execution were largely
confided to the Community institutions. And this law is directed
against restrictions of competition by private parties as well as by
the Member States. The latter concern dumping practices, aids
granted by States which threaten to distort competition, and fiscal
provisions of internal changes, drawbacks or turn-over taxes practiced
by a State and adversely affecting production of another State.'
With regard to private practices, the Treaty contains the very
important provisions of articles 85 and 86 which may be said to consti-
tute the antitrust law of the Community. This law must be viewed
in the context of the basic concept of the Common Market. It em-
bodies rules of behavior that would allow enterprises and consumers
to respond fully and on equal terms to the new economic incentives
offered by the Common Market. Unimpeded and undistorted compe-
tition is an instrument aiming at the integration of the markets of the
Six. This policy is even more necessary in view of the objective of the
2 See Riesenfeld, "The Protection of Competition" in II American Enterprise in the
European Common Market-A Legal Profile 197. On the Belgian law of 1960, see del
Marmol, La Protection contre les abus de puissance econornique en droit belge, (Liege
1960); on the German law, see Shapiro, "The German Law against Restrictions of Com-
petition," 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 201; on the French and Dutch law, see "Guide to Legis-
lation on Restrictive Business Practices," European Productivity Agency, O.E.E.C., Vols.
I and II.
3 Reference also may be made to art. 37 of the Treaty concerning State monopolies
of a commercial character with respect to which the Member States undertake to cease
all discrimination between nationals of Member States, in regard to conditions of supply
and marketing of goods, at the expiration of the transitional period. The Commission
has issued recommendations to France and Italy for the gradual adjustment of the State
monopolies on tobacco and matches. See journal Officiel des Communautes Europeennes,
June 23, 1962, at 1500/62.
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Community to encourage concentration of European industries in order
to realize the large-scale production at low cost which is made pos-
sible by the creation of the Common Market.
The antitrust law of the Community is also to be viewed as an
essential means of creating a genuine European economic union. It is
in this context that the Commission has taken action to harmonize and
unify the law in many directions. It has taken the initiative for the
creation of Common Market patent, trademark and design laws
through Conventions between the Six. A community-wide Convention
on bankruptcy is in preparation. Work has already been done toward
standardization of the system of awarding public contracts to avoid
any discrimination against firms of Member States. Harmonization
of legislation is being prepared with respect to quality, composition,
packaging and labelling of foodstuffs to eliminate variations which
may prevent or impede expansion across frontiers and cheaper mass
production. A uniform company law for the Common Market and a
common veterinary legislation are the subject of special working
parties.
Last but not least, the Council of Ministers of the Common
Market adopted, in December 1961, a general program for the sup-
pression of restrictions to the "freedom of establishment" in the Com-
mon Market, which means that nationals of the six States exercising
non-salaried professional activities-manufacturers, traders, crafts-
men and men of liberal professions-may move freely, establish them-
selves and render services in any of the six States provided only they
are nationals of any of such States.
It is this general framework against which the antitrust law of
the European Economic Community is to be viewed.
ARTICLES 85 AND 86 oF THE TREATY
The substantive law of the Common Market on restrictions of
competition resides in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome.
Article 85 prohibits, as incompatible with the Common Market,
any agreements between enterprises, any decisions by associations of
enterprises, and any concerted practices, which meet a double test:
(a) are apt to affect trade between the Member States; and
(b) have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market.
With regard to the first test, English translations of the text use
the word likely rather than apt. The latter is the correct translation of
the French word in the text, susceptibles, or the German word geeignet.
There has also been much discussion about the word affect of the
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English translation which is a correct rendering of the original French
term affecter, as well as of the German beeintrichtigen. Only the Dutch
and Italian texts use terms which carry an implication of "adverse"
effect on trade leading to an interpretation permitting restraints having
a "good effect" on trade between the Member States.4 It is believed
that the Commission is not disposed to see any such distinction. It
considers the word affect as imparting a reference to any restraint
that bears on trade between Member States, as distinct from trade
within a Member State. In other words, the test has the same meaning
as the commerce clause in American constitutional law.
It is important to note that the Treaty does not propose to replace,
or substitute for, national law on restraints of competition within the
confines of each Member State. It deals only with restraints which
affect more than national trade. Thus, national legislation on restric-
tions of competition regulating trade within the territory of each
Member State remains unaffected.
With regard to the second test, it will be noted that it is not neces-
sary that a restraint of competition actually occurred. It is sufficient
that an agreement aims at restraining competition. It will also be noted
that there is no qualification of unreasonableness nor that the restraint
should relate to a substantial part of the trade of the goods concerned.
In other words, no rule of reason is implied or may be read into the
prohibitions of article 85(1).
Article 85 speaks of "enterprises" and no distinction is made as
to whether the enterprises are located in the Common Market or not.
Therefore, an agreement 5 between an American enterprise and an
enterprise located in the Common Market, or an agreement between
two enterprises both located outside the Common Market, are equally
included in the prohibition of article 85(1) so long as they meet its
double test. The "affectation doctrine" of the Sherman Act is thus
recognized in the Treaty and influence of agreements between enter-
prises located in foreign States may affect trade in the Common Market.
Article 85(1) also proceeds by way of illustration to list the kinds
of agreements which are deemed prohibited. These are:
(a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or
of any other trading conditions;
4 This position was maintained by Advocate General Maurice Lagrange in his sub-
mission of conclusions to the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the
Bosch case. See Thompson, "The Bosch Case," in Int'l & Comp. L.Q., Vol. II, Part 3, 4th
series, July 1962, at 721, 733.
5 Hereafter, reference is made to "agreements" for purposes of simplification without
also mentioning "decisions of associations" and "concerted practices."
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(b) the limitation or control of production, markets, technical
development or investment;
(c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply;
(d) the application to parties to transactions of unequal terms
in respect of equivalent supplies, thereby placing them at a
competitive disadvantage;
(e) the subjecting of the conclusion of a contract to the accept-
ance by a party of additional supplies which, either by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contract.
An exemption from the prohibition of article 85(1) of the Treaty
may be granted under article 85(3) provided that certain positive and
negative requirements are met. Thus, certain agreements, even though
they restrain competition, will be allowed if it can be shown that they
are reasonable.
The two positive requirements for the application of this rule of
reason are:
(a) that the agreements contribute to the improvement of the
production or distribution of goods or to the promotion of
technical or economic progress; and
(b) that they reserve to users an equitable share in the profits
resulting from such improvement of production or distri-
bution or from the promotion of technical or economic
progress;
and the two negative requirements are:
(c) that they do not impose on the enterprises concerned any
restrictions not indispensable to the attainment of the above
objectives; and
(d) that they do not enable such enterprises to eliminate compe-
tition in respect of a substantial proportion of the goods
concerned.
These requirements and the application of article 85(3) will be
considered fully hereinafter in discussing agreements relating to indus-
trial property. Suffice it to say here that this paragraph constitutes a
legislated rule of reason. The unqualified prohibitions of paragraph
(1) are mitigated by the provisions of paragraph (3). The test of
reasonableness under this paragraph applies throughout the length
and breadth of article 85(1), so that there is no part of the prohibi-
tions of article 85(1) which remains outside the scope of article 85(3)
and constitutes conduct unlawful per se.
Agreements which are prohibited by article 85(1) of the Treaty,
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and from which no exemption is granted under article 85(3), are null
and void under article 85(2) of the Treaty.6 It will be noted that
article 85(2) speaks only of agreements between enterprises and deci-
sions of associations as being null and void. It does not also refer to
"concerted practices" since the latter do not constitute juridical acts.
The agreements which are thus declared null and void are the
agreements which are prohibited by article 85 (1), and this refers not to
an entire contract between enterprises but to those agreements included
in a contract which article 85(1) prohibits. Whether the nullity or
voidance of a particular "agreement" in a contract entails nullity or
voidance of the entire contract depends on the national law which is
to be applied to the contract.7
As will be explained hereafter, the Commission of the EEC, in its
decision condemning a restraint, holds only that it is prohibited by
article 85(1) and is not justified under article 85(3). The question
of the nullity of the contract as a whole is a question of the national
law of the country before which this issue arises.
This is then the general structure of the law under article 85 of
the Treaty.
Article 86 of the Treaty prohibits abusive exploitation of a
dominant position by one or more enterprises. In order that the prohi-
bition may be applicable, three conditions must be fulfilled:
(a) the enterprise or enterprises concerned must occupy a dom-
inant position within the Common Market or within a
substantial part thereof;
(b) the enterprise or enterprises must make an abusive use of
such position;
(c) such abusive use must have an effect on trade between
Member States.
How great a degree of dominance is required for the existence of
a dominating position is not defined in article 86. Since the concept
probably comes from the German Act Against Restraints of Compe-
tition, it is not unlikely that the Commission will follow the definition
of section 22 of such Act. Under this, an enterprise has a dominating
position when it is "without competitors or not subject to substantial
competition in a certain type of goods or services." Two or more
enterprises are considered "market dominating" when no substantial
6 Indeed, art. 85(2) speaks of agreements "prohibited pursuant to this Article," mean-
ing paragraph (1) as well as paragraph (3).
7 Such law determines how far a contract as a whole may remain valid and effective
notwithstanding the nullity of a particular clause. Ordinarily, the issue will turn on the
question whether the particular clause is of the essence of the contract.
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competition exists in fact between them and they are not subject to
substantial outside competition. Thus, the size of the quantitative share
of the market is not a test but the territorial share is, since article 86
requires that domination extend to a substantial part of the Common
Market. The basic element of inter-State affectation is always present
so that the domination must affect more than the territory of a Mem-
ber State.
Article 86 does not require that the enterprise or enterprises exer-
cising a dominating position be located within the Common Market.
A foreign enterprise may exercise such position in the Common Market
and be subject to the provisions of this article.
It will be noted that the Treaty does not attack domination, as
such, and the problems raised in the United States against monopoly
or oligopoly are not present here. Many monopolies arise out of
acquisition or merger and these are sanctioned by the Treaty.
What is condemned is abuse of a dominating position. Article 86
defines abuse by giving illustrated examples, such as:
(a) The imposition of inequitable purchase or selling prices or
inequitable trading conditions;
(b) The limitation of production, market and technical develop-
ment, to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) Discriminating practices placing parties at a competitive
disadvantage;
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts dependent upon the pur-
chase by the other party of goods not related in kind or trade
custom.
These are very much like the abuses referred to in section 22 (4)
of the German Act. There has been no decision in Germany under
this section to throw full light on the meaning of abuse of dominating
position. On the other hand, these illustrated examples find their
counterpart in article 85 of the Treaty and the interpretation of both
may be alike.8
Since article 86 prohibits only abuse, naturally, it does not pro-
vide for any exemption as article 85 does in paragraph 3. It may be
expected, however, that the Commission will be likely to strike down
price-fixing, discrimination and tie-in agreements as well as exclusive
representation and exclusive dealing when a dominating enterprise is
8 Only the case of "market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply" of article
85 is not listed in article 86 since, obviously, this does not apply to a dominating enter-
prise. The other difference is that article 85 prohibits all direct or indirect fixing of prices
or other trading conditions, whereas article 86 condemns imposition of inequitable prices
and inequitable trading conditions, which is consonant to the concept of abuse.
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a party, whereas it may excuse such, under article 85(3), when the
enterprises concerned have no dominating position in the market.
With regard to both articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, there was
since 1959 considerable discussion as to whether their provisions were
self-executing and immediately applicable law without the necessity
of national legislation in the Member States to put them into effect.
This question has now been authoritatively resolved by the Court of
Justice of the Economic Communities in its decision of April 6, 1962,
in the Bosch case.' This came up as a result of the question put to
that court by the Court of Appeals of The Hague: "whether the pro-
hibition to export imposed by Bosch to its customers and accepted by
them under contract is null by virtue of article 85(2) of the Treaty
insofar as export to the Netherlands was concerned." The question
was referred to the Court of Justice under article 177 of the Treaty
which provides that the court is competent to render a preliminary
decision concerning the interpretation of the Treaty-in this case,
article 85.
The court held that the provisions of the Treaty were in principle
immediately applicable rules of law; but with regard to article 85(2),
it ruled that a prohibited agreement in existence at the commencement
of the Treaty was not ipso facto null as of the coming into effect of
the Treaty on January 1, 1958. The court ruled that paragraphs one
and three of this article were an indivisible whole, and that prior to
the issue of Regulation No. 17 there was no procedure by which the
Commission of the European Economic Community might pass on the
question whether an agreement violating the principles of article 85(1)
could be justified under article 85(3). No action had been taken with
regard to such an agreement pursuant to the transitory procedures
envisaged by articles 88 and 89 respectively for State authorities and
the Commission, prior to the coming into effect of the Regulations.
An important question arising under the Treaty with respect to
both articles 85 and 86 is the meaning of the word enterprise. Is this
a legal or an economic concept? This becomes relevant particularly
under the Regulations, as will be seen, in connection with the provision
of article 4(2) (ii) (b) which refers to agreements between two enter-
prises only, and also in the procedure on notification concerning the
joining of enterprises in such notification. But it is particularly im-
portant in connection with the prohibitions of article 85(1) which
speak of "agreements between enterprises" since it raises the question
whether an agreement between a parent company and its subsidiary
is to be deemed as being an agreement between two enterprises.
9 Bosch and Van Rijn v. de Geus, decision issued April 6, 1962. See Journal
Officiel des Communautes Europeennes, May 4, 1962; Thompson, op. cit. supra note 4.
[Vol. 23
COMMON MARKET
One might have been inclined to distinguish between several
situations: a parent and a wholly-owned subsidiary generally might
be deemed one enterprise, since the subsidiary in such a case is in
effect a branch or division of the parent economically speaking, and
could not, as a matter of fact, be in competition with the parent. Often
such subsidiaries are organized for the purpose of promoting, servicing
or developing the sale of the parent company's products. On the other
hand, if the subsidiary is not wholly-owned but merely controlled by
a majority of stock interest, it should be possible to consider whether
in fact it has competitive interests with the parent; or whether there is
a strong minority whose interests, from the point of view of competi-
tion, may not coincide with those of the majority shareholder; or
whether the subsidiary is able to make independent business decisions
even though technically controlled by the parent. The writer's con-
versations with officials of the Commission revealed that the position
of the Commission was not fixed on the interpretation of the word
enterprise in the Rome Treaty.
However, the Court of Justice has dealt with the interpretation
of the term in the Coal and Steel Community Treaty. In the latest
decision of the Court of March 22, 1961,"0 the Court analyzed the
concept of enterprise in such a decisive manner that, although the
case involved the Coal and Steel Community Treaty, it appears un-
likely that this Court will give a different interpretation to the term as
used in the Rome Treaty. The Court said:
We must take a closer look at the concept of the enterprise. It
presents itself as a unitary aggregate of personal, material and
intangible factors, attributable to an independent juridical subject,
pursuing over the long run a definite economic purpose.... The
commonness of economic activity does not entail commonness in a
legal sense, so long as the legal consequences of such activity are
attributable to different legal subjects. .... Such a change in the
legal position occurs automatically with the creation of the new legal
personality and it is irrelevant whether the economic relations which
existed before the change remain the same. Viewed from this
vantage point, the conditions for the existence of a legally auton-
omous enterprise indubitably exist even in the case of a legal
person whose interests are closely tied to those of another legal
subject and whose initiative is determined by externally originating
guide lines.
REGULATIONS Nos. 17 AND 27
These two Regulations, the first by the Council of Ministers and
the second by the Commission of the European Economic Community,
10 Wirtsbaft und Wettbewerb 1962, No. 7-8.
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have filled in the procedural gaps left in the formulation of articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty. It is important to recognize that these Regu-
lations deal solely with the implementation of the Treaty clauses and
not with substantive law.
Regulation No. 1711 was issued by the Council under authority
contained in article 87 of the Treaty, and Regulation No. 2712 was
issued by the Commission by virtue of article 24 of Regulation No.
17, and deals with the form, content, and other details of applications
and notifications submitted to the Commission pursuant to articles 2,
3, 4 and 5 of the said Regulation.13
Contrary to the original draft of Regulation No. 17 as prepared
by the Commission in 1960 (and submitted by the Council of Minis-
ters to the Economic and Social Committee and the European Parlia-
ment for advice), the final text does not make it mandatory to notify
the Commission of any restrictive arrangement violating the provisions
of the Treaty. Instead, it provides for three things:
The first article of Regulation No. 17 states the principle that
agreements referred to in article 85(1) and the abusive exploitation
of a dominant position in the market in the sense of article 86 of the
Treaty are prohibited, and no previous decision to that effect is neces-
sary. This resolves the question of principle, just as the Court of
Justice did in the Bosch case.
Article 2 of this Regulation provides for a negative declaration by
the Commission, on the application of the interested enterprises, that
it has no grounds to intervene in regard to a situation under article
85(1) or article 86. This is the so-called "negative clearance" of an
agreement, to be discussed hereinafter.
Then articles 4 to 8 of Regulation No. 17 deal with the procedure
of registration and effects of exempting agreements in application of
article 85(3) of the Treaty. This registration is theoretically volun-
11 Published in the Official Journal of the European Communities on February 21,
1962, effective March 13, 1962.
12 Published in the Official Journal of the European Communities on May 10, 1962,
effective May 11, 1962.
13 Mention should also be made here of Regulation No. 26 of the Council of
Ministers dated April 4, 1962, and effective July 1, 1962 (Journal Officiel, April 20, 1962,
at 933/62), in implementation of art. 42 of the Treaty. This article provides that the
provisions on restriction of competition (arts. 85-94) shall apply to the production of and
trade in agricultural products only to the extent determined by the Council of Ministers.
Regulation No. 26 applies, to agreementa relating to the production of or trade in agri-
cultural products, the provisions of arts. 85 and 86 of the Treaty, subject only to some
exceptions that may be authorized by the Commission, relating mainly to agreements




tary. Only those enterprises wishing to avail themselves of this pro-
cedure need notify their agreements. Practically, however, notification
is essential. Because, as a condition precedent to claiming the exemp-
tion of an agreement under article 85(3) of the Treaty, notification
has to be made. The Commission has exclusive jurisdiction, under
article 9, to decide that an agreement prohibited by article 85(1) is
exempted under article 85(3).
There is a distinction made between existing agreements and new
agreements. The date which separates the two is the date of the com-
ing into effect of Regulation No. 17, i.e., March 13, 1962. Agreements
concluded on or after that date which contain any restrictions repug-
nant to article 85(1) of the Treaty should, under article 4 of the Regu-
lation, be notified to the Commission, if the interested enterprises
desire to avail themselves of article 85(3). No time limit is given for
such notification, but unless and until notification is made of such an
agreement, no exemption under article 85(3) can be given. An agree-
ment violating article 85(1) will be null and void up to the date of
the notification, even though the Commission should subsequently
grant it the exemption of article 85 (3). In other words, the exemption
will be retroactive only to the date of the notification. And the enter-
prises concerned may be subjected to the fines provided for-in article 15
of the Regulation for the violation of the Treaty up to the date of the
notification.
It will be noted that article 7 of Regulation No. 17 (to be consid-
ered hereafter) which permits validation of an agreement subject to
amendment does not apply to new agreements, but only to those
concluded prior to March 13, 1962.
Article 4 dispenses from notification certain classes of agreements,
but since these classes are also dispensed from notification under article
5, they will be discussed as a distinct third category of agreements.
Existing agreements, i.e., agreements concluded prior to March
13, 1962, are governed with respect to notification by article 5 of Regu-
lation No. 17. If it is desired to seek the exemption of article 85(3)
with respect to such agreements, notification was made necessary prior
to August 1, 1962. This deadline has now been extended by a new
Regulation No. 59 of the Council of Ministers14 to November 1, 1962,
with respect to all such agreements, and to February 1, 1963, with
respect to agreements between two enterprises only.l5 The Commission
14 Published in the Journal Officiel on July 10, 1962, effective July 11, 1962.
25 It is interesting to note that the further prolongation to February 1, 1963, with
respect to two-party agreements was recommended by the European Parliament. See
Journal Officiel, July 25, 1962, at 1805/62. '
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may either grant or refuse exemption of such an agreement under
article 85(3).
If exemption is refused, the legal result is that the agreement is
considered ipso facto null and void, 6 as falling under the prohibitions
of article 85(1), and such nullity is retroactive to March 13, 1962,
unless the Commission validates the agreement as a result of amend-
ment under article 7(1) of the Regulation. If exemption is granted,
such exemption will be retroactive to March 13, 1962, and this means,
of course, under the Bosch decision, to the effective date of the agree-
ment.
Exemption also means that no fines may be imposed for conduct
under the agreement between the date of notification and the date of
the Commission's decision, and prior to the date of notification if noti-
fication is made prior to the stated deadline.
On the other hand, failure to notify the agreement before the
stated deadline, even though the Commission should exempt the agree-
ment under article 85(3), will not cover the period between March 13,
1962, and the actual date of late notification. In other words, the
decision of the Commission granting exemption under article 85(3)
in such a case may have retroactive effect only to the date of such
notification. Moreover, a fine may be imposed under article 15 for
conduct under the agreement between March 13, 1962, and the date
of the late notification.
At this point, the provisions of article 7 of Regulation No. 17
may be considered. They provide that an agreement concluded prior
to March 13, 1962, and notified to the Commission prior to the stated
deadline, with respect to which the Commission is not willing fo grant
the exemption of article 85(3) of the Treaty, may nevertheless receive
this benefit if the enterprises concerned abandon or modify a restrictive
clause to which exception is taken. The Commission then will fix the
period to which the exemption applies. In other words, the Commission
has the discretion to make the exemption retroactive to any date it
chooses, which means a date prior to the amendment of the agree-
ment. 7 But this provision cannot be invoked against enterprises
which have not given their express assent to the notification of the
agreement. It follows that an enterprise which is in doubt as to
whether the Commission will grant exemption under article 85(3) to
an existing agreement without amendment and who is anxious to assert
16 In the sense that the particular restrictive clauses are null and void, and this
may bring about the nullity of the entire contract, see note 7 supra.
17 This is a troublesome provision when considered with respect to article 85, since
the Commission may thus be able to declare valid an agreement which prior to the
amendment was null and void under such article.
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such agreement against another enterprise party to the agreement
should make sure that such other enterprise explicitly agrees to the
notification of the agreement to the Commission. 8
The third category of agreements envisaged by articles 4 and 5
of Regulation No. 17 are those which are dispensed from notification
under paragraph 2 of article 4 and paragraph 2 of article 5. These
agreements are excepted from the procedure of paragraph 1 of both
articles which means that the exemption of article 85(3) of the Treaty
may be claimed with respect to such agreements even though they are
not notified as provided in such articles. This does not mean that these
agreements are valid ipso facto under article 85(1) or that they are
ipso facto exempted under article 85(3). As the Court of Justice said
in the Bosch case, they are presumed valid unless a contrary decision
is made by the Commission or by the appropriate national authorities
when the issue arises.' 9 It is because of this presumption of validity
that the Regulation provides (articles 4 and 5) that they may be noti-
fied to the Commission, if the interested parties so desire.
Thus, even though such agreements are notified at any time after
the fixed deadline for other agreements, the Commission's decision
declaring these as exempt under article 85(3) of the Treaty will be
retroactive not only to the date of notification but to the date when
the conditions of article 85(3) are fulfilled. But if the Commission
decides that such an agreement is not exempted from the prohibitions
of the Treaty under article 85(3), then such an agreement will be
declared null as of March 13, 1962, subject, however, to the provision
of article 7(2) of the Regulation. This means that even though the
Commission decides that it cannot grant the exemption, it may, if the
agreement is amended, limit the prohibition to a period fixed by it
provided that notification is made prior to January 1, 1964. Accord-
ingly, no fine may be imposed for conduct under the agreement between
the date of notification and the date of the Commission's decision,
18 It will be noted that article 7 speaks of enterprises "which have given their
express consent to the notification," and this does not mean that they have formally
joined in the notification. Under Regulation No. 27, notification may be made by one
of the participating enterprises and it is only required that such enterprise inform the
other participating enterprises that such notification is being made. If such other enter-
prises should merely inform the notifying enterprise that they agree to such notification,
this would be sufficient for the purposes of article 7.
19 In a lecture given before the Chamber of Commerce of Brussels (Bulletin de ]a
Chambre de Commerce de Bruxelles, July 20, 1962, at 552) by Mr. Schumacher, Chief of
the Directorate of Competition of the Commission of the EEC, it was pointed out that
the dictum of the Court of justice in the Bosch case with respect to these agreements,
dispensed from notification, meant that their validity depends on the decision of the
Commission in applying article 85(3) of the Treaty.
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and prior to the date of notification provided that notification is made
prior to January 1, 1964.
The category of agreements thus dispensed from notification by
articles 4(2) and 5(2) of Regulation No. 17 includes certain classes
of agreements, and for our purposes here, the important class is that
of article 4(2) (ii) (b):
agreements to which two enterprises only participate and which
have the sole effect
to impose upon the purchaser or the user of rights of in-
dustrial property-namely, patents, utility models, de-
signs or trademarks-or upon the beneficiary of contracts
involving the transfer or licensing of manufacturing proc-
esses or knowledge relative to the use and application of
industrial techniques, limitations in the exercise of such
rights.
This provision of Regulation No. 17 will be analyzed hereafter in
discussing industrial property agreements.
Regulation No. 27 deals with the form, content and details of
applications and notifications to the Commission. It provides particu-
larly that every enterprise, party to an agreement, is authorized to
file an application under article 2 or a notification under articles 4
and 5 of Regulation No. 17, and therefore it is not necessary that all
participating enterprises join in the application or notification. It is
only required that the applying or notifying enterprise must inform
the other enterprise that it is filing the application or notification.
It is further provided that seven copies of the application or
notification must be submitted, and this applies also to the documents
attached, such as the agreement, which must be certified or conformed
to the original. All papers must be in one of the official languages of
the Community: French, German, Italian or Dutch.
An application or notification will be considered as being in order
only if the prescribed forms are filed in conformity with Regulation
No. 27 and within the term fixed. The purpose of the forms is to set
out all of the information and data which the Commission requires
in order to be able to pass upon the case.
Notification is not the only way by which the Commission obtains
information on existing agreements or practices and with respect to
which it has power to act. Regulation No. 17, in pursuance to the
provisions of article 89 of the Treaty, which places on the Commission
the duty to insure the application of the principles of articles 85 and
86, provides for the following:
(a) Under article 3 the Commission may act, on request or ex
officio, in finding infringement of article 85 or 86. Ex officio
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action may be instigated by any person-a private informer
-whether he has an interest in the matter or not. He may
send information to the Commission about an alleged in-
fringement. The Commission has provided that this may be
done by a letter addressed to it which need not comply with
any particular formalities. Such a person has no standing
with the Commission and cannot insist that the Commission
act.
(b) "Any person who shows a justified interest" may file a re-
quest to the Commission complaining about an infringement
of article 85 or 86. The complainant must set out the nature
of his interest; that he considers an agreement to which he
is a party as prohibited by article 85 and wishes it to be so
declared by the Commission; that he is defendant in an ac-
tion before a national court involving an agreement which
he considers null and void; or that he feels his interests as
a competitor are being adversely affected by a restrictive
agreement.
(c) Such a request may also be filed with the Commission by a
Member State.
(d) Under article 12, the Commission may decide to conduct a
general inquiry if, in any sector of the economy, the trend
of trade between Member States suggests that competition
is being restricted or distorted within the Common Market.
In conducting such inquiry, the Commission may require
any enterprise or group of enterprises in the sector concerned
to communicate to it all agreements which are exempted
from notification under articles 4(2) and 5(2) of Regulation
No. 17.
In any of these cases, if the Commission finds that there is in-
fringement of either article 85 or 86 of the Treaty, it may do one of
two things:
(i) It may render a decision ordering the enterprise or enter-
prises concerned to put an end to the infringement. Such a
decision is published and may be supplemented by the im-
position of a fine up to $1,000,000.00 and a daily penalty
from $50.00 to $1,000.00 for each day that the Commission's
order is disregarded; or
(ii) It may address to the enterprise or enterprises concerned a
"recommendation" designed to put an end to the infringe-
ment. This recommendation is not published and is not sub-
ject to appeal. Its purpose is to settle the matter amicably
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and to induce the enterprises concerned to give up the
infringement voluntarily.
It should be further pointed out that the Commission has tremen-
dous powers of investigation itself (article 14) and it may also call
upon the Member States to carry out investigations which the Com-
mission considers necessary (article 13).
Thus, detection of wrongdoing is facilitated by a panoply of in-
vestigating procedures and powers under the Treaty and Regulations.
A question relating to investigation of agreements which may
disturb enterprises is the publicity which may be attendant to it.
Article 10 of Regulation No. 17 provides that the Commission shall
transmit without delay to the competent authorities of the Member
States copies of the requests, applications and notifications, together
with copies of the most important documents which have been trans-
mitted to it. This means that the Commission will transmit to such
authorities:
(a) any request sent to it under article 3 of the Regulation com-
plaining that an enterprise is infringing article 85 or 86 of
the Treaty;
(b) any application under article 2 of the Regulation for a nega-
tive clearance of an agreement;
(c) any notification of an agreement under article 4 or 5 of the
Regulation.
The national authorities may submit their views to the Com-
mission. In order to strengthen the cooperation of the Commission
with the Member States, a Consultative Committee is provided for
in article 10 of the Regulation, composed of competent officials repre-
senting the Member States. Presumably, each State, on receiving com-
munication of (a), (b) or (c), will instruct its representative on the
Consultative Committee to give the Commission its views. The Com-
mission will call meetings of the Consultative Committee when it is
ready with a preliminary draft of a decision. The Consultative Com-
mittee's opinion is only in the nature of advice to the Commission
and is not binding upon it.
In view of this procedure, it is clear that the national authorities
of the Member States, such as the German Cartel Office, will be fully
informed on the agreements and other information and data supplied
by an enterprise or gathered by the Commission. On the other hand,
under article 19(3), when the Commission intends to give a negative
clearance or to render a decision granting exemption under article
85(3), it "shall publish the essential content of the application or
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notification, inviting all interested third parties to submit their obser-
vations within a time limit." "Essential content" of the application
or notification does not include publication of the agreement nor even
of the data and facts advanced by the enterprise concerned in support
of its application or notification. Indeed, the above provision of
article 19(3) goes on to say:
Publication shall respect the justified interest of the enterprises
that their business secrets shall not be divulged.
Both the Commission and the national authorities of the Member
States who receive communication of agreements are enjoined by arti-
cle 20 of the Regulation "not to disclose matters which have come to
their knowledge through the application of the present Regulation
and which, by their nature, are professional secrets."
Finally, an important problem under the Treaty and the Regu-
lations is the relative jurisdiction of the Commission and the national
courts. Article 9 of Regulation No. 17 provides that the Commission
is given exclusive jurisdiction in respect of article 85(3). This raises
two difficulties in respect of concurrent jurisdiction as regards articles
85(1) and 86 and as regards the nexus between paragraphs 1 and 3
of article 85.
On the subject of concurrent jurisdiction, paragraph 3 of article
9 provides that, as long as the Commission has not initiated any pro-
cedure pursuant to articles 2, 3, or 6, the authorities of the Member
States shall remain competent to apply articles 85(1) and 86, even
if the time limits for notification have not expired. Thus, if the Com-
mission has initiated such action, the national authorities of the
Member States are precluded from acting. The converse, however,
is not true, in the sense that the fact that the national authorities have
taken jurisdiction does not prevent the Commission from taking action.
It would seem that in the latter case the national authorities should
suspend proceedings, at least in cases where the Commission will
consider also the exemption under article 85(3) upon notification of
an agreement.
The issue of a negative clearance by the Commission will probably
have considerable weight on a national court, but it will not be binding
upon it. On the other hand, if the Commission should find a violation
of article 85 or 86 and its finding is confirmed by the Court of Justice,
this should have a substantial moral effect on a national court, even
though it is not binding upon it. The nullity of an agreement, as in
violation of article 85(1), may always be pleaded before a national
court by a party to a civil action based on such agreement, even if
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such an agreement has not, in the meantime, been notified to the
Commission. But if subsequently the Commission issues a decision
granting exemption under article 85(3), this decision will be binding
on the court and may nullify a decision of the court declaring the
agreement void. Therefore, it is expected that a court, confronted
-with a plea by a defendant that the agreement is void and informed
by the plaintiff that the agreement has been notified to the Commission
for the purpose of exemption under article 85(3), will doubtless sus-
pend the case to wait for the decision of the Commission.
There is one exception to this: If the plaintiff failed to notify the
agreement within the time limit fixed by the Regulations, the national
court may, nevertheless, proceed to decide on the validity of the agree-
ment because the decision of the Commission may grant exemption
under article 85(3) only as of the date of the late notification and the
court may declare the agreement null and void between the date of
March 13, 1962, and the date of the late notification to the Com-
mission. This strange result may be caused by the failure to notify
the agreement to the Commission within the time limit fixed by the
Regulation.
AGREEMENTS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
The above exposition purported to analyze the general structure
of the Treaty provisions and of the procedure for their application
under the Regulations. It is against this general picture that agree-
ments relating to industrial property may now be considered.
Enterprises concerned in this class of agreements are faced with
the following problems:
(a) Must they consider that such agreements are subject to the
prohibitions established by articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty?
(b) Must they resort to the "negative clearance" procedure of
article 2 of Regulation No. 17?
(c) Must they defer notification in view of the optional dispen-
sation from it provided for in articles 4(2) and 5(2) of this
Regulation?
(d) How far may such agreements, when prohibited under article
85(1) of the Treaty, be exempted under article 85(3)?
Each of these problems shall now be considered.
Articles 85 and 86
It is impossible to maintain the position that agreements relating
to industrial property are outside the purview of articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty simply because it is the nature of industrial property
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to create exclusionary privileges and therefore restraint of competition.
The two fields are not incompatible. Conflict arises when industrial
property rights are used beyond their legitimate scope. The question
is rather one of boundary: where does the patent or trademark privi-
lege end and where does the unlawful restraint begin.
Nor does article 36 of the Treaty permit such an interpretation,.
because it authorizes import restrictions when required for "the pro-
tection of industrial and commercial property rights." This recognizes
the prerogative of owners of such rights to exclude products which
infringe these rights only. Moreover, this provision is qualified in that
"such prohibitions or restrictions shall not constitute . . . disguised
restrictions of trade between the Member States." This qualification
is broad in its purpose and may be deemed to be an indirect reference
to articles 85 and 86.
Furthermore, article 4(2) (ii) (b) of Regulation No. 17, in dis-
pensing from notification, without prejudging validity, the class of
agreements relating to industrial property, is a clear proof that such
agreements are governed by articles 85 and 86.
The only thing that can be said, then, about such agreements is
that the Treaty does not purport to affect the national law of the
Member States and the provisions of other international treaties (as
provided for in article 234) which grant and guarantee the existence
and exercise of industrial property rights and the exclusionary privi-
leges inherent thereto; from which it follows that in considering agree-
ments between enterprises relating to industrial property, under articles
85 and 86, the existence of these inherent monopolies must be taken
into account.
Article 2 of Regulation No. 17
If consideration of the agreement determines that a doubt exists
whether it comes under the prohibitions of article 85(1), should the
interested parties apply only for a "negative clearance" under article
2 of Regulation No. 17 rather than notify this under articles 4 or 5?
The declaration provided for in article 2 is not a decision by the
Commission that a particular agreement submitted to it is not pro-
hibited under article 85(1) of the Treaty. It is merely a declaration
that the Commission, in the light of the facts brought to its knowledge,
does not propose to intervene by taking action against this agreement.20
20 The Commission when called upon to give a negative clearance under article 2
of Regulation No. 17 does not proceed itself to a verification of the facts, as it does when
an agreement is notified under articles 4 and 5 for exemption under article 85(3) of the
Treaty. The Commission, on the basis of the application filed and the agreement sub-
mitted to it, may determine to reject the application and notify the applicant that it
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If the circumstances change in the future or if new elements are
brought to the attention of the Commission as a result of a complaint
or information by an interested party, the negative clearance loses its
effect. Moreover, the issue of the invalidity of the agreement may
always be raised in any case where this may be relevant; for instance,
in the case where a licensee under the agreement refuses to pay the
royalties provided for in the agreement alleging that such agreement
is null and void as prohibited by article 85 (1). Any court before which
this issue is raised may decide without any regard to the declaration
issued by the Commission under article 2.
Because of this, it would appear that the negative clearance
procedure should be followed only in cases where the agreement ap-
pears unobjectionable and the interested parties desire to have ad-
ditional assurance on this.21
Articles 4(2) and 5(2)
Should notification of the agreement be deferred because the
interested parties deem it to be dispensed from notification as included
in the exemption of article 4(2) (ii) (b), i.e., it is an agreement which
imposes limitations within the exercise of a right of industrial property?
The significance of this dispensation from notification has been ex-
plained above. An error with respect to the question whether dispensa-
tion from notification is applicable to the particular agreement may
have serious consequences by depriving the parties concerned of the
benefits of retroactivity of the Commission's decision and by the
exposure to fines for conduct under the agreement. The significance of
the failure to notify within proper time becomes particularly clear
when the issue of the validity of the agreement is raised in a court
proceeding in a Member State. If the licensee refuses to pay royalties
under a patent or trademark agreement or deals with know-how
furnished by the licensor contrarily to the agreement alleging that the
proposes to do go. It will give such an enterprise an opportunity to be heard. It will not
publish the decision of rejection. If the Commission determines to grant the negative
clearance, it will publish the essential content of the application and invite interested third
parties to present their views. If no objections are made by such third parties, the Com-
mission will grant the application.
21 Mr. Schumacher in his lecture, referred to in note 19 supra, suggested that the
procedure for negative clearance may particularly be resorted to in respect to new agree-
ments, since parties may be desirous to know promptly whether such an agreement is
prohibited or not, and the Commission will give a much quicker declaration under article
2 than under article 6 of the Regulation.
See also Response of the Commission to the question propounded to it by Mr.




agreement is void, the court can only decide whether the agreement
is prohibited under article 85 (1). It has no power to hold that although
it is so prohibited, the agreement nevertheless is exempted under
article 85(3). Only the Commission has power to decide concerning
such exemption and the Commission can only so decide when the agree-
ment has been notified to it.
It should be noted also that the dispensation from notification
concerns restrictions in industrial property agreements which constitute
only "limitations in the exercise of the rights" in industrial property.
A question of interpretation of these terms arises.
In this connection, a comparison first may be made with the Ger-
man Act of 1957 against Restrictions of Competition. This Act, after
dealing with restrictive agreements in general, has a special section 20
on agreements relating to patents, designs and trademarks, and section
21 on those relating to know-how. Section 20 prohibits and declares
invalid such agreements only "if they impose upon the acquirer or
licensee any restrictions in his business conduct which go beyond the
contents of the said privileges." The provision then goes on to indicate
which restrictions are not deemed to go beyond the contents of .the
privilege, or even though they may go beyond, they are nevertheless
permitted because of an accepted policy not to discourage such agree-
ments in view of the public interest involved in enabling industrial
property to be put to a wider use in the community. Thus, "restrictions
pertaining to the type, scope, quantity, territory, or exercise of the
privilege shall not be deemed to go beyond its contents."
It is submitted that the words of article 4(2) (ii) (b), "the exer-
cise of these rights," are not equivalent to the words "the contents of
the privilege" in section 20 of the German Act. The words contents
and exercise convey entirely different meanings. Content is what is
comprised or included within the legal framework of the right. Exercise
is the act of practicing or of performing the functions of the right.
Certainly, the further statement in the first paragraph of section 20
of the German Act that "restrictions pertaining to the type, scope,
quantity, territory or exercise of the privilege are not deemed to ex-
tend beyond its [the privilege's] contents" must be deemed to be
included in the meaning of the terms "exercise of these rights" in
article 4(2) (ii) (b).
Since the terms "in the exercise of these rights" go beyond the
terms "the contents of these privileges" in the German Act, it would
seem that any restrictions which have a real rapport with the right
involved (patent, trademark, design or know-how) or are normally
and directly related to the exercise of the right involved should be
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-deemed to be covered by the provision of article 4(2) (ii) (b) of Regu-
lation No. 17.
It should follow from this that the restrictions referred to in
-the second paragraph of section 20 of the German Act should be
-deemed to be the kind of restrictions which are included in the terms
"limitations in the exercise of the rights" of article 4(2) (ii) (b) of the
_Regulation. These, under the German Act, are:
(1) restrictions imposed upon the acquirer or licensee in so far
and as long as they are justified by any interest of the seller
or licensor in the technically unobjectionable exploitation of
the matter protected by the privilege;
(2) obligations of the acquirer or licensee with respect to the
prices to be charged for the protected article;
(3) obligations of the acquirer or licensee to exchange experi-
ences or to grant licenses for improvements or related in-
ventions if these correspond to reciprocal obligations of the
patent owner or licensor;
(4) obligations of the acquirer or licensee not to challenge the
protected privilege;
(5) obligations of the acquirer or licensee relating to the regu-
lation of competition outside the areas of applicability of
this law;
it being understood, however, that item (5) would relate to a restric-
tion in the exercise of the right outside the Common Market.
Accordingly, an agreement relating to industrial property rights
which contains restrictions of this type, deemed to be restrictions "in
the exercise of the rights," are dispensed from notification and the
enterprises concerned are not required to notify such agreements for
the purpose of obtaining a decision of the Commission granting the
benefits of article 85(3). This is, of course, subject to two conditions:
(a) that there is no other type of restriction in the agreements
which goes beyond the terms of article 4(2) (ii) (b); and
(b) the enterprises concerned do not care to have the benefit
of article 7 of the Regulation, i.e., the possibility of amend-
ment of the agreement, as may be required by the Commis-
sion, with respect to any restriction objectionable to it. If
they do wish to have the benefit of article 7, then notification
of the agreement should be made prior to January 1, 1964,




Article 85 (1) and 85 (3)
We are now reaching the final problem of the application of the
prohibitions of article 85(1) of the Treaty and the exemption under
article 85(3) to agreements relating to industrial property. These are
ordinarily and predominantly license agreements. There may be agree-
ments of pure transfer of patents or trademarks or sale of know-how,
but these are usually only between a parent and a subsidiary or in-
cidental to investment or the creation of a joint venture enterprise.
In so far as they may contain restrictive clauses, they may be grouped
together with what are commonly termed license agreements.
The primary motivation of these agreements at the present time
differs from that during the years immediately following the end of
World War II. Quota restrictions, prohibitions of import licenses,
foreign exchange difficulties and high tariffs made it necessary then
to resort to license agreements in order to permit an enterprise to make
money from the exploitation of its industrial property rights in foreigr
markets. These motivations still exist. However, in the Commor
Market countries at the present time where trade restrictions are
gradually disappearing as between Member States as well as between
Member and non-Member States, the reasons for the conclusion of such
agreements may be quite different: a more efficient division of labor,
sources of supply of materials and labor, differences in cost of
production, taxation differences, exploitation of industrial property and
immunities from competition.
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty are not concerned with these
motivations, except in so far as their object or result is to restrain trade
between Member States. Certainly these Treaty provisions did not
intend to confide in the institutions of the European Economic Com-
munity the right or responsibility to pass upon, or create a substitute
for, the judgment of the parties as to whether the agreements are wise
or unwise from the business point of view, or whether they take undue
advantage economically of any of the parties to the agreement.22 This,
of course, hardly needs mentioning except to underline the fact that
the Treaty has not entrusted the Commission with any power of
planning the economic structure of the Common Market. On the con-
trary, the object of the Treaty is to create the general legal and
economic framework within which private enterprise may move freely
to the accomplishment of its economic ends.
22 As Mr. Justice Brandeis put it in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 24&
U.S. 231, 238 (1918): "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade,
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is their very essence. The true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes com-
petition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
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Article 85 of the Treaty comes into consideration when enter-
prises by their agreements or their conduct may restrict competition
between Member States, no matter how lacking in mutuality or unwise
the agreements may be for the particular parties; and article 86 when
there may be involved an abuse of dominant position within the Com-
mon Market, no matter how dominant the position of an enterprise
may be. It is in this framework that industrial property agreements or
practices may be considered.
The prohibitions of article 86 may be quickly dismissed with
regard to this branch of agreements. Very rarely could an enterprise or
enterprises be thought to possess such a dominant position in the Com-
mon Market so that its abuse may be struck down under article 86.
Conceivably, of course, there may be a case of a really dominant
effect of a patent (rarely, if ever, of a trademark, design, or know-how)
so basic that it affects a large segment of industry in the Common
Market. The near totality of patents in the present state of technology
relate to improvements or refinements of industrial production and
abuse of the economic power of such patents is inconceivable. Further-
more, "abuse of monopoly" in a patent is eliminated by generally ac-
cepted correctives in the Member States of the Common Market con-
sisting in compulsory licenses for reasons of public interest or for
failure or insufficiency of working.
Article 85 involves two inquiries with respect to industrial
property agreements: to what extent the prohibitions of paragraph 1 of
article 85 may come into question, and when the prohibitions may be
justified under paragraph 3 of that article. The first query will be
considered in reviewing the nature of these agreements and particular
clauses. The second calls for a closer look into the two positive and two
negative requirements of article 85(3).
It will ordinarily not be difficult to maintain that industrial
property agreements generally satisfy the two positive requirements.
It is in the nature of industrial property to contribute to the improve-
ment of the production or distribution of goods or to promote tech-
nical or economic progress, and therefore agreements relating to
industrial property achieve this requirement. It is to be noted, in this
connection, that improvement of production and technical progress
are referred to disjunctively. A patent license agreement may of
necessity promote technical progress within the meaning of the provi-
sion even if it does not also improve the production or distribution of
goods, and the latter is therefore not necessary.
Also, it is in the nature of such agreements to obtain for users or
consumers an equitable share in the profit resulting from such improve-
ment of production or distribution or the promotion of technical or
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economic progress. This does not mean necessarily a lowering of the
price of goods. An improvement of quality, a quicker delivery or a
better service through the increase of the number of suppliers may
likewise be a sufficient benefit to the consumer resulting from the
restraint.
The two negative requirements for the application of article 85 (3)
are that the agreements relating to industrial property
(a) neither impose on the enterprises concerned any restrictions
not indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives;
(b) nor enable such enterprises to eliminate competition in
respect of a substantial proportion of the goods concerned.
It is interesting to compare these provisions with paragraph 3 of
section 20 of the German Act. This provides that the Cartel Authority
may approve an agreement imposing restrictions on the business
activity of the licensee exceeding the scope of the patent protection:
. . . if the freedom of economic action of the licensee or any
other enterprise is not unfairly restricted, and if competition is
not substantially restrained through the restrictions involved.
The last phrase of this provision finds its counterpart in negative
requirement (b) of article 85(3) in introducing the element of sub-
stantiality of the trade which is being restricted. This is considered
from the point of view of trade between the Member States.
The real difficulty in the provisions of article 85(3) is negative
requirement (a), and particularly the word indispensable therein,
which is a hard word. There is some question whether this means the
same thing as the word unfairly in the above quotation from para-
graph (3) of section 20 of the German Act. Rather the true mean-
ing may be gathered by asking the opposite: Could the attainment of
the objectives of improvement of production and distribution of goods
or the promotion of technical and economic progress contemplated by
the agreement be accomplished without the particular restriction in
question? If the answer is in the negative, then the restriction is an
indispensable one.
Having thus laid the basis of the application of articles 85 and 86
of the Treaty to industrial property agreements, it may be possible to
proceed to consider how vulnerable these agreements may be with
respect to their provisions.
In this connection, it may be first noted that such agreements may
be of two general kinds: those that deal with such rights in themselves
without any explicit restrictions, and those that transfer or license such
rights and are coupled with explicit restrictions. For purposes of
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simplification, it is proposed to consider agreements relating to patents;
those involving trademarks; and those concerned with know-how.
PATENT AGREEMENTS
Agreements relating to patents without explicit restrictions, for
instance, an agreement by the foreign owner of a patent in Germany
granting to a German firm the exclusive right to make, use and vend the
subject matter of the patent in Germany only, is no more than a state-
ment of the inherent exclusivity of the patent grant under the German
law. It should follow also that the owner of patents in each of the six
Member States of the Common Market may grant exclusive licenses to
separate firms in each of the six States under the patent in each. Such
a bundle of exclusive territorial licenses may affect trade between
Member States in the subject matter of the patent, but the territorial
restriction is not the object or result of the agreements, but rather a
restriction inherent in the separate patent grants under the national
law of each of the Member States. It is precisely the principal object
of the project for the establishment of a European Patent Convention,
promoted by the Commission of the Common Market, to abolish
private frontiers created by such separate patent grants. But until
such a system is set up and patent grants are issued for the whole of
the Common Market, the above territorial allocation is an unavoidable
consequence of the accepted jurisdictional limitation of patent rights.
Coming now to patent agreements with explicit restrictions, con-
sideration may be given to the various kinds of such restrictions.
Territorial restrictions. These may be mere restrictions of the
patent's inherent exclusivity or may go beyond it. The owner of
patents in each of the six Member Countries of the Common Market
may impose a covenant upon the licensee under the German patent
that the latter shall not export to any of the other five countries. This
may be an unnecessary covenant, but if it is imposed, questions may
arise as to whether its object or result is to prevent competition between
the Member States. This involves a consideration as to whether the
scope of the patents in the other five countries is the same both with
respect to the content of the privilege and the subject matter, and also a
consideration of the validity of the other patents, or the position in
case of the earlier lapse of such patents by its normal term or as a
result of revocation or forfeiture.
On the other hand, if there are no patents in the other countries
of the Common Market, the covenant not to export or sell in the other
countries may be deemed repugnant to the prohibition of article 85 (1).
The question then will be whether it is justified under article 85(3).
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Such justification cannot be the theoretical argument that the patentee,
by virtue of his privilege under the German law, could refuse a license
and therefore could make the license subject to such limitation. The
answer to that is that the patentee is utilizing his bargaining power
under the patent to impose a prohibited territorial restriction.
A covenant, on the other hand, by the licensor patentee not to
make or sell the subject matter of the patent in the licensee's territory
may be an inducement to the licensee to make the investment for the
working of the patent, but may also be a peg on which to hang the
restriction against competition between the State in which the license is
granted and the other States of the Common Market in which the
licensor operates. In any case, the restriction goes beyond the power
of the patent and may even have a more anticompetitive effect than
even if no patent existed at all in the particular country. Such an
agreement calls for justification under article 85 (3) of the Treaty upon
notification to the Commission. The nature of the patent and of the
market involved, the existence of competition between the licensor
and the licensee before the agreement was concluded, the primary
intent of the parties and the interest of the consumer may enter into
the consideration of the restriction.
Restrictions of type, scope, quantity or term of license. These are
the kinds of restrictions which the German Act considers as comprised
within the contents of the patent privilege. Certainly, an agreement
which licenses the manufacture only of the subject matter of the patent
in Germany, but not the sale in Germany, is not subject to objection.
The reason for such an agreement may be that the patentee prefers to
handle, himself or through his own distribution outlets, the sale of the
licensed product. Also, an agreement which permits the licensee only
to make and sell a type of product covered by the patent, but not all
products within its scope, should be unobjectionable. Finally, agree-
ments permitting the licensee to manufacture a certain quantity only
or limiting the license to a certain term of years and not to the whole
term of the patent are within the scope of the patent right. All of these
may affect trade between Member States but are restrictions inherent
to the patent grant.
Price restrictions. Article 85(1) of the Treaty explicitly prohibits
agreements consisting in "the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or
selling prices." But, on the other hand, article 4(2) (ii) (a) of Regula-
tion No. 17 dispenses from notification agreements between two
enterprises only which restrict the freedom of one party to the
agreement to fix prices in the resale of goods acquired from the other
party. This indicates that in the case of vertical agreements between
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two parties, the fixing of prices of resale is presumably valid. Thus,
even though such a restriction on a patent licensee may go beyond the
scope of the patent grant, it may be justified under article 85(3).
This is particularly so if the patentee reserves the right to sell the
patented product in the licensee's territory by importation from the
other countries of the Common Market, and provided there are no
other restrictions in the agreement exhibiting an intent to eliminate
competition or restrain trade between Member States.
Tying provisions. Article 85(1) of the Treaty prohibits any
agreement which makes it conditional upon acceptance by the licensee
of supplies "which, either by their nature or according to commercial
usage have no connection with the subject of such contract." In the case
of a patent agreement, the imposition on the licensee of the obligation
to purchase from the patentee components or materials which are
not covered by the patent may be an improper extension and misuse of
the patent monopoly. It is to be noted that the German Act against
Restraints of Competition permits the patentee to impose such an
obligation if it is necessary to ensure that the patented product is
properly manufactured and exploited. For instance, if proper operation
of certain machines covered by the patent requires certain supplies
sold only by the patentee or of which he is the only manufacturer,
the German Act upholds the tie-in clause. The opposite is the case if
such materials or supplies are equally available in like quality from
third parties. Under article 85(1), the introduction of the concept of
"commercial usage" mitigates the prohibition and permits a tie-in
clause even though it is beyond the scope of the patent monopoly. It
further indidates that the clause may be justified under article 85(3)
by showing what the commercial usage is. Another possibility of
justification may exist when the restriction amounts to a minimal fore-
closure as compared with the whole range of business alternatives open
to competitors within the Common Market.
Covenants not to contest validity of patent. A covenant by a
licensee not to contest the validity of the patent under which he is
licensed is not within the inherent exclusivity of the patent grant.
But it is not a restraint affecting trade between Member States so long
as it is limited to the term of the agreement, and therefore, it is not an
agreement prohibited under article 85(1). But if it goes beyond the
term of the agreement or extends to patents under which the licensee is
not licensed, it may have the result of preventing or restricting com-
petition between Member States and it can be justified, if at all, only
under article 85(3).
Grant-back provisions. The German Act does not prohibit "obliga-
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tions of the licensee to exchange experiences or to grant licenses of
patents involving improvements on or applications of the licensed
patent insofar as such obligations correspond to reciprocal obligations
by the patentee." Such an obligation under a patent license agreement
may be deemed to be a limitation "in the exercise of the right" in the
patent under Art. 4(2) (ii) (b) of Regulation No. 17. If the license
concerns a basic patent and the improvement cannot be used without
it, it may be argued that for the life of the patent the obligation of the
licensee to disclose the improvement or license the use thereof to the
licensor does not really amount to a restriction either of the licensee or
of competitors. And even though the patent and the improvement are
alternative solutions to the manufacture of the products or the applica-
tion of the process, the obligation of the licensee may be justified if
there is a reciprocal obligation on the patentee to disclose improvements
to the licensee, or if the concerns involved are small firms, or the
patents or improvements involved are of minor importance.
Certainly any obligation of the licensee to transfer to the licensor
the whole right in the improvements or for all countries outside the
licensed territory would not be justified.
An alternative clause giving the licensee a choice either to patent
his improvements and then grant the licensor a royalty-free license, or
else to transfer to the licensor the right to apply for the patents in the
licensor's own name, should not be objectionable.
Agreements not to compete. Patent license agreements may contain
a limitation on the licensee not to produce or distribute products in
competition with the patented article. Such a restriction certainly goes
beyond the scope of the licensed patent and is a restriction of competi-
tion prohibited under article 85(1) if it affects trade between Member
States; for instance, if it is between a patentee of a non-Member State
or of a Member State and an enterprise in another Member State.
Such a restriction might be justified under article 85(3) in very
special circumstances; for instance, if the licensee is a joint venture
enterprise in which the patentee has made an investment, and its
object is to exploit the patent; or if the competing products involved
are closely related to those covered by the patent so that the income
from the royalty due to the patentee would be seriously affected by the
production and sale of such competing products.
Other situations. The above discussion deals essentially with
single patents licensed to single licensees. It is not proposed to deal
with more complicated situations such as agreements for future patents,
package licensing, cross licenses, patent pools, and the like. These gen-
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erally, when affecting trade between Member States, may involve
restraints which can only be justified under article 85 (3) of the Treaty.
The unqualified prohibitions of article 85(1) and the absence of any
possible application of "rule of reason" or any "ancillary doctrine" in
this paragraph of article 85 make it obvious that the only hope of
exemption is through presentation of the case to the Commission by
notification under the procedure of Regulation No. 17.
The refusal of the Commission to consider a restriction in a patent
license agreement as a reasonable one under the tests of article 85(3)
means that the agreement remains prohibited under article 85(1) and
the particular clause is null and void under article 85(2). Whether the
entire license contract falls depends on the national law of the partic-
ular country. If the license provides that the nullity of a particular
clause shall not affect the contract as a whole, this would permit the
construction that the parties intended to remain bound by it notwith-
standing the nullity of the particular clause. Otherwise, the parties
may have to litigate whether the contract remains effective on the
ground that the particular clause is or is not of the essence thereof.
In any case, the Treaty itself does not encourage the creation of
the doctrine of patent misuse in curbing monopoly fashioned by the
courts in the United States. The law in the Member States of the
Common Market does not recognize such a doctrine which strips the
patentee of judicial protection of his property because of encroach-
ment outside the boundaries of the patent.
TRADEMARK AGREEMENTS
In connection with agreements relating to licensing of trademarks,
we again have two general categories: those which contain no explicit
restrictions, and those which are coupled with explicit restrictions. The
first category involves the inquiry whether there is a prohibited
territorial allocation in the mere fact that a license is granted for one
of the six Member States of the Common Market to a local enterprise,
while the trademark proprietor retains full rights in the other five
countries or licenses other firms separately in such other countries. The
legality of such a transfer or license of a trademark for a particular
State involves primarily a question of the trademark law in such
country. It is this law which determines whether such a territorial as-
signment or license is valid.
But assuming such validity, to the extent that the assignment or
license confers upon the assignee or licensee (if exclusive) a lawful
power to exclude the owner or other licensees in other countries of the
Common Market from use of the trademark in the particular country,
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a territorial restriction may be accomplished without contractual
restraint. Is this, then, an agreement prohibited by article 85(1) of the
Treaty?
The answer depends upon whether, as in the analogy of a patent
agreement without contractual restriction, the territorial restriction is
the result of the agreement or is a restriction inherent in the separate
trademark rights under the national law of each of the Member States.
The answer is compelled by the generally recognized principle under
national law as well as under the International Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property that trademark rights are territorial
in character and depend for their existence on the law of the particular
country in which they are claimed. It makes no difference in this
connection that in some countries, such as Germany, a trademark right
depends on registration and in others on prior use or knowledge of the
trademark in the trade. In both cases, the recognition of title in the
trademark is by the law of the particular country. Again, in support
of this view, reference may be made to the fact that the Commission of
the Common Market is sponsoring the adoption of a European Trade-
mark Convention, the principal object of which is to abolish private
frontiers created by such separate territorial grants of trademark
rights.
The other kinds of trademark agreements are those that contain
explicit restrictions on the trademark owner or the licensee. Such
restrictions are:
Quality control. This is certainly unobjectionable. Control of the
standards and quality of the products made by the licensee is a pre-
requisite to the validity of the mark under license. Any provisions
for the participation of the licensor in the licensee's affairs limited
to setting of standards, sampling, inspection, and the like, would be
justified. If the position goes beyond that, by agreement or by practice,
so as to control output or investment or marketing, it may be objection-
able under article 85(1).
Ingredients or raw materials control. If, as a condition to using
the licensor's mark, the licensee must buy manufacturing components
from the licensor or sources under his control, the effect is to prevent
competition with the licensor in the sale of such components or raw
materials to the licensee. The licensor can only insist that the licensee
meet quality specifications. A permissible exception is allowed if the
trademark denotes a product made under a secret formula of the
licensor.
Export controls. A provision in the agreement prohibiting export
from the licensee's territory to other countries of the Common Market
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does more than spell out the jurisdictional definition of the trademark.
The protection of the trademark in the other countries is buttressed
by explicit limitation. This appears to be prohibited by article 85(1).
It is to be noted that article 4(2) (i) of Regulation No. 17 dispenses
from notification intrastate agreements between enterprises in a Mem-
ber State, provided they do not concern imports or exports between
Member States. Such an agreement was involved in the Bosch case
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. While the
court refused to deal with the facts of the case in view of the manner
in which the case came before it on a question of interpretation of the
Treaty, it nevertheless indicated that such an agreement appeared to
be prohibited by article 85(1).
An agreement may not have an explicit prohibition on the licensee
against exporting goods bearing the licensed trademark outside the
licensed territory, but may provide that a licensor shall consider the
use by the licensee of the trademark outside such territory as an in-
fringement of the licensor's trademark rights in the other countries.
Assuming, for instance, that the licensor has registrations for his
trademark in all six countries of the Common Market and he licensed
the use of his trademark in Germany only to a German licensee, would
the above provision be proper?
National courts have refused to enforce territorial limitations un-
der the trademark law or the contention that the trademark owner
has separate territorial trademark rights in each country and may
enforce such rights as against persons importing in a country goods
upon which the mark has been affixed in another country by the
proprietor. A decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ren-
dered on December 14, 1956, in the Grundig case held that "the owner
of a trademark does not have the right by marketing his branded
articles to establish limitations with regard to the distribution of his
goods as, for example, exclusive jurisdiction in a certain territory and
to regard noncompliance with such limitations as an infringement of
his trademark rights. '2 3
23 Prins v. Grundig, International GRUR 259 (1957). The German company, manu-
facturer of Grundig radio sets and registered proprietor of this trademark in Germany
and the Netherlands, brought action for trademark infringement in the Netherlands
against a local party selling such radios, which were obtained from German wholesalers
at a lower price than that of the authorized Dutch distributor. The lower court dismissed
the action on the ground that the plaintiff had exhausted his trademark rights with
respect to the goods by placing them into regular channels of trade in Germany. The
court of appeals reversed on the theory that the plaintiff had exhausted only his German
trademark rights by selling the radio sets in Germany and that the unauthorized import
into the Netherlands constituted a violation of the plaintiff's right to determine the
manner in which he wished to enjoy his Dutch trademark rights. The Supreme Court
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The Swiss Supreme Court in a decision rendered October 4, 1960,
in the Philips case overruling, in effect, its own previous decisions to
the contrary, followed the decision of the Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands. It stated that the trademark law does not grant the right to the
trademark owner to set up territorial limitations for the sale and distri-
bution of his products and to enforce such territorial limitations.24
The latest decision on this subject is the decision of the Court of
Appeals of Frankfurt rendered February 2, 1962, in the Maja case.2
The court made a very close analysis of the essence of a trademark
right, the territorial principle and the scope of protection afforded by
trademark law. It concluded that "it is not the purpose of the trade-
mark law to supply the trademark owner, by means of the trademark,
with a weapon for controlling the market." The trademark owner
"exhausts his trademark right" by placing the goods in commerce in
a country, and when the genuine goods, made by the owner or by
another with his authority are imported in another country, he has no
right to object to the importation or sale in such other country based
on his separate territorial rights in the country of importation; nor,
said the court, does such an invasion in the territory of an exclusive
distributor constitute, in itself, an act of unfair competition, regard-
less of any damage caused to the distributor by that invasion alone.
In these recent cases, the trademark owner has claimed trademark
sided with the court of first instance, holding that, while the plaintiff probably had a
remedy in contract against the German wholesalers from whom the defendant obtained
the sets and possibly a remedy of unfair competition against the defendants as being
beneficiaries of the German wholesalers' breach of contract, it was not the purpose of
the trademark law to empower the trademark owner to regulate the mode and channels
of sale of the products bearing his trademark.
24 Philips A. G. v. Radio-Import G.m.b.H., 86 II B.G.E. 270 (1960). The defendant
obtained Philips television sets in Germany, made by a German licensee of the plaintiff,
and sold them in Switzerland at prices lower than those charged by Philips' Swiss sub-
sidiary. It was the plaintiff's contention that the sale in Switzerland of German-made
goods constituted an infringement of the plaintiff's Swiss trademark registration. The
court held that the public understanding was that the name, Philips, as used in Switzer-
land, had come to identify the products of the Philips concern as a whole, and it added:
"... (I]t is not within the contemplation of the statute to extend the right in a trademark
to an independent and absolute property right which would be invoked by manufacturers
to prevent all possible interference with business interests."
25 Reported in "Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters," July 1962, at 203-
206. In this case a Spanish soap manufacturer had its trademark, Maja, for soap registered
in Spain as well as in Germany. It granted exclusive distributorship rights in Germany
to a German importer. When another German importer purchased from Spanish whole-
salers the Maja soaps manufactured by the Spanish plant of the owner and sold them
at a lower price in Germany, the German exclusive distributor brought injunction pro-
ceedings under the German Trademark Act in the name of the Spanish trademark owner.
The lower court upheld the action, but was reversed by the court of appeals.
1962]
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infringement against an unauthorized importer based on his trademark
registration in the country of importation. It is believed that the
trademark owner would not succeed, even though the importer ob-
tained the goods from a foreign licensee. The Philips case was such
a case, and in the Maja case the court clearly indicated that it would
make no difference whether the goods imported were made by the
proprietor or under his authority.
On the same theory, the trademark owner could not successfully
proceed against the licensee himself in another State, alleging that he
is committing infringement in that State by using the trademark there,
through direct importation, when the use authorized was only in the
licensed territory. However, such act by the licensee in violation of
the agreement may justify the licensor under national law to cancel
the agreement or enable him to obtain a decree of a court in the State
where the licensee is located, enjoining the licensee from violating the
agreement. In such a case, however, the Commission of the Common
Market may decide that the particular clause of the license is prohib-
ited by article 85(1) as being, in effect, an attempt to enforce terri-
torial allocation. Such a clause would be null and void without
necessarily involving nullity of the contract as a whole, if it should be
held, on the licensee's contention, that the clause is not of the essence
of the contract. The licensor, however, may be able to justify this
clause under article 85(3) on the ground that the standards and speci-
fications or the presentation or get-up of the products made by the
licensee in his licensed territory are different from those approved for
the other countries of the Common Market and, therefore, there would
be confusion of the public as well as serious injury to the trademark
owner's goodwill.
Price controls. Article 85(1) specifically lists as a prohibited
agreement one that contains direct or indirect fixing of purchase or
selling prices. Article 4(2) (ii) (a) of Regulation No. 17 dispenses
from notification agreements between two enterprises only, the sole
effect of which is to restrict the freedom of one party to the contract
to fix prices for the resale of goods. This does not necessarily mean
that horizontal price agreements are prohibited while vertical agree-
ments may not be. The legality of agreements dispensed from notifi-
cation is always open to question. The safe course is to notify the
agreement and seek exemption of the price fixing under article 85(3).
It is possible that the licensor's involvement in generating the goodwill
embodied in the mark may be argued to justify price maintenance.
The fact that the agreement does not fix the price of resale by
the licensee but merely provides that the prices shall not exceed a
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certain maximum, or that the licensee shall seek to maintain as low
a price as possible and in any case not higher than a certain price,
will not necessarily avoid the prohibition of article 85(1). Minima
or maxima prices tend to become fixed prices. The Commission may
consider the facts under article 85(3) and may justify the provision
in a case where the licensor is genuinely interested in the widest pos-
sible consumption of a branded article embodying his goodwill and is
seeking to bring about a lowering of prices in the territory.
Selling controls. A license agreement may provide that the licen-
see shall sell the products bearing the licensed trademark only to the
licensor or to parties designated by the licensor, as for instance, the
licensor's distribution channels. Such a restriction may be justified
provided the facts are such that it does not distort competition by, for
example, imposing this limitation on a former competitor. If the li-
censee remains free to produce and sell similar articles under marks
other than the licensed trademark, the limitation may be justified.
The agreement would then be in effect a manufacturing agency agree-
ment although it may not have the features of a true agency relation-
ship.
Production controls. A license agreement may require the licensee
not to manufacture or sell products except under the licensor's trade-
mark. This might be deemed to prevent competition and come under
the prohibition of article 85(1) concerning agreements limiting or
controlling production, markets, technical developments or investment.
It will have to be justified under article 85(3). It may be excused
because of the licensor's desire to promote the goodwill and value of
his trademark; or because the licensor has communicated to the li-
censee valuable know-how and the restriction is ancillary to this grant;
or because the licensee was not, prior to the license, a competitor of the
licensor so that the agreement itself did not have the object or result
of eliminating competition.
Covenant not to contest validity of the licensed trademark. Such
a covenant for the duration of the agreement is certainly unobjection-
able. Moreover, it is probably not prohibited even if it endures after
termination or cancellation of the agreement. It does not in itself
restrict competition in trade, after termination, between the licensor
and the licensee. There is no public interest, as there is in a case of
a similar covenant for a patent, in the invalidation of a trademark or
registration moving from the licensee.
Non-competition after termination of license. An agreement may
provide that the licensee shall not deal in competing products after
termination or cancellation of the license. This is a restriction under
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the prohibition of-article 85(1), but may be justified under the facts
of a particular case under article 85(3). Factors which the Commis-
sion will probably consider in passing on the restriction are that the
licensor has granted to the trademark licensee valuable know-how
which is unrecoverable, the duration of the agreement before termi-
nation, the extent of the investment made by the licensee as a result
of the license and the extent of time during which the restriction
endures.
KNow-How AGREEMENTS
Regulation No. 17 implementing articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
is an international instrument recognizing the special property in
know-how. The terms used in article 4(2)(ii)(b) of the Regulation
are "manufacturing processes or knowledge relating to the utilization
or application of industrial techniques." The terms used are broader
than those of section 21 of the German Act of 1957 which applies the
provisions of section 20 (so far as appropriate) to agreements involv-
ing the transfer or exploitation of "legally unprotected inventions,
manufacturing processes, technical designs and other technological
achievements . . . if such achievements constitute business secrets."
The requirement of secrecy is not included in the provision of the
Regulation.
For our purposes here, we shall use the convenient term "know-
how." However, it is clear that this may mean different things, such
as tangible information consisting in formulae, processes, designs or
unpatented inventions; accumulated experience and skill of an intan-
gible nature which can only be communicated by instruction; recorded
information embodied in lists of materials, technical data or manuals
which serve to solve production problems; or finally, advisory, tech-
nical or managerial expert guidance in the laying out of plants or
machinery, and the like.
Of whatever kind, know-how is a valuable business asset for the
acquisition of which enterprises are willing to pay a price, just as much
as for a patent or a trademark representing a goodwill. Indeed, while
there are many cases where know-how by itself may form the subject
matter of a license agreement, more often it is associated with a license
under patents or trademarks. But while in some cases the know-how
may be usable only with the patent and is subsidiary to it, serving
only to make more effective the use of the patent, in other cases the
patent is of minor importance and serves only as a front for the know-
how agreement. Similarly, in the case of a trademark and know-how
agreement, the know-how may be merely secondary to the trademark
license and in other cases the trademark license is an appendage to
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the grant of know-how. These differences are material considerations
in evaluating restrictions in agreements involving licensing of know-
how.
In know-how agreements, it is important to distinguish between
restrictions calculated to protect the know-how against unauthorized
use or disclosure and restrictions granting immunities from compe-
tition. The former are analogous to covenants seeking to protect a
patent against forfeiture or a trademark against invalidation. In fact,
know-how, once transferred or communicated to a licensee, may be
lost since it cannot be precisely traced or identified as the use of a
trademark or patent and there is no effective way of withdrawing it
from the licensee. Therefore, restraints on disclosure or misuse in
themselves involve no antitrust problem.
Exclusivity in the grant of know-how to a licensee in a country of
the Common Market is not in itself prohibited under article 85 of the
Treaty since it is the exercise of the inherent right in the ownership
of such know-how just as much as the grant of an exclusive license
to work a patent or to use the proprietor's trademark. It is when this
grant is coupled with explicit restrictions that article 85 may come
into question.
If an agreement transfers or licenses patents or trademarks and
at the same time know-how, explicit restrictions which are prohibited
under article 85(1) and may or may not be justified under article
85(3) of the Treaty will not be dealt with differently because they
include a grant of know-how. This is particularly so because there is
no general recognition under foreign laws of a property right or stat-
utory monopoly in know-how as there is in patents and trademarks.
For purposes of analysis then, we may consider explicit restraints in
agreements relating to know-how whether or not this is coupled with a
license under patents or trademarks. On the other hand, the value of
the know-how furnished to the licensee may be a material consider-
ation in justifying a restraint under article 85(3), since in the absence
of substantial value in the know-how furnished, the positive require-
ments of this article may be absent and the recitation of communi-
cation of know-how may then appear as a "cover" for naked
restrictions of competition. It is to be expected, therefore, that the
Commission will seek to be assured as to the 'value of the know-how,
and as to the situation of the licensee before and after the transfer
of the know-how. Thus, if the licensee was not an actual competitor
of the licensor prior to the license, if the production of the licensee
was substantially improved after the license, or if the restraints im-
posed are minor, the Commission will be more likely to justify the
restraints imposed on the licensor or the licensee.
1962]
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Specific restrictions in a know-how agreement may now be
considered.
Export restrictions. A restriction on a licensee in a country of
the Common Market not to export to the other countries of the
Common Market is prohibited by article 85(1). It may be excused,
however, under article 85(3) if the know-how has real value, if the
restriction is not of long duration, if the market involved is not sub-
stantial and if there is a good competitive position in goods of a similar
character.
Price controls. These are condemned under article 85(1) and
would probably not be excused under article 85(3) in a bare know-
how license unless possibly the licensor himself sells identical goods in
the same markets and may claim that he has a legitimate interest in not
being the victim of his own creature.
Output or sales controls. A covenant by the licensee to sell to
certain types of customers only, or to manufacture only a specified
line of products with the licensed know-how, or to use such know-how
in specified plants only in certain countries of the Common Market
may be condemned by article 85(1) and would require very cogent
reasons for justification under article 85(3). Only proof of a sub-
stantial value of the know-how and of the fact that but for such know-
how the licensee's manufacture would have been impossible may justify
such restrictions.
Non-competitive products. A usual restriction in know-how agree-
ments is to limit the licensee to the products for the manufacture of
which the know-how is transferred. If the licensee has been engaged
before the license in any other line of production and can still produce
such products by methods and processes alien to the know-how re-
ceived, the restriction may be justified. However, the restriction would
not probably be excused if it extends to a period beyond the life of
the agreement. Likewise, a restriction on the licensee requiring him
to cease the manufacture of the licensed products with the know-how
received after termination of the license would be struck down, unless
it is limited to manufacture with the licensed know-how which has not
fallen in the public domain with the fault of the licensee.
ExcLusivE DISTRIBUToR AGREE MENTS
Related to agreements involving industrial property are arrange-
ments under which a manufacturer appoints an exclusive dealer or
distributor of his products in a particular country-in our case in a
Member State of the Common Market. These are not, properly, li-
cense agreements. since the distributor does not manufacture the
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products or use the trademark on products other than those of the
manufacturer. He may receive instructions and information on mer-
chandising, servicing and advertising of the products, but these are
not what is ordinarily identified as know-how.
These arrangements are to be distinguished from agency agree-
ments, where the agent acts for his principal and on the principal's
behalf by obtaining orders to be filled by the manufacturer and for
which the manufacturer bills the purchaser, while the agent receives
a commission or other compensation. In these cases, it is the principal
who determines the manner of conduct of his own business, and the
fact that he uses an exclusive or sole agent to obtain orders does not
involve a restriction contemplated by article 85.
Exclusive distributor agreements may be of two kinds: Those in
which the manufacturer agrees to appoint the distributor as an exclu-
sive distributor, in the sense only that no other distributor will be
designated or appointed for the particular territory; and those in which
the manufacturer agrees not to sell to customers or prospective pur-
chasers in the territory of the exclusive dealer or distributor and not
to allow other distributors to do so, the exclusive distributor agreeing
not to sell to purchasers located in another country or to purchasers
who may export to another country. The first category of agreements
obviously is not objectionable under article 85(1) of the Treaty. They
restrain only the manufacturer's freedom to select the channel of dis-
tribution of his products in the particular country. They do not affect
trade between Member States or prevent or restrict free movement
of goods within the Common Market.
It is difficult, however, to maintain that exclusive distributor
agreements which restrict distribution of goods in one Member State
of the Common Market and prohibit free movement of goods to the
other Member States are not in violation of article 85 (1) of the Treaty,
in the light of its unqualified terms and in the light of the object of
the Treaty to bring about the interpenetration of the markets of the
Member States.
The Commission appears to have adopted this construction of the
Treaty as shown by statements included in its Third (paragraph 143)
and Fourth (paragraph 50) General Reports. It may also be noted
that in the original draft of Regulation No. 17 as prepared by the
Commission and which required compulsory registration of agree-
ments, an exemption from notification was made with respect to agree-
ments between two enterprises which had as their sole effect:
(c) to oblige a supplier to furnish certain merchandise to a
purchaser exclusively;
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(d) to oblige a purchaser to buy certain merchandise from a
supplier exclusively; or
(e) to institute exclusive representation for certain products or
services of an enterprise.2 6
Regulation No. 17, as finally issued, omits any reference to ex-
clusive dealer or distributor agreements in the exceptions from notifi-
cation in article 4(2).
It is submitted that the question of the propriety of such agree-
ments must be viewed under the provisions of article 85(3) of the
Treaty. Mr. Schumacher in his aforementioned address to the Cham-
ber of Commerce of Brussels27 stated that the Commission is studying
the question of a new Regulation concerning such agreements, and
that the postponement of the deadline for notification of agreements
between two parties to February 1, 1963, was motivated by the desire
to afford an opportunity to the Commission to deal with this problem.2
In this connection, it may be noted that article 85(3) of the
Treaty does not provide that its application can only be made by
specific exemption granted by the Commission. This particular proce-
dure was selected by Regulation No. 17. Conceivably, the Council of
Ministers has the power, on the recommendation of the Commission
pursuant to article 87 of the Treaty, to issue a separate Regulation
making article 85(3) ipso facto applicable to certain types of agree-
ments or under certain defined circumstances deemed to meet the
tests of reasonableness of article 85(3). Indeed, article 22 of Regu-
lation No. 17 provides that within one year from its effective date, i.e.,
prior to March 13, 1963, the Council shall examine, upon the Commis-
sion's proposal, "the special provisions which could be made, in dero-
gation from the provisions contained in this Regulation, with respect
to the agreements referred to in articles 4(2) and 5(2)."
26 European Parliamentary Assembly Document No. 57, 1961-1962, at 41-42.
27 See note 19 supra.
28 In the Bosch case, supra note 9, the manufacturer Bosch and its exclusive Dutch
agent, van Rijn, pointed out in their argument that the agreement had not been prohibited
by the German Cartel Office; that far from preventing, restricting or distorting competi-
tion, the activity of sole agents tends to promote trade and competition; that by main-
taining their own sales organization in different sectors of the market, together with
advertisements, market research, maintenance of stocks and a repair and after-sales
service, they were able to overcome regional barriers and achieve a larger production at
a cheap rate. The Commission argued before the court that the restriction constituted a
restriction of competition which tended to maintain within the Common Market the
dosed national markets for the products concerned, which was in contradiction to the
fundamental objects of the Treaty to promote trade and open the markets. The German
Government agreed with the Commission. It felt that the restriction tended to prohibit
the sellers of Bosch products in the free use of products and to limit the ultimate consumer
in the free choice of suppliers.
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Exclusive dealer or distributor agreements are not ordinarily
made with respect to goods sold in bulk. They usually relate to
branded products and, therefore, are agreements coming under the
general category of the exception of articles 4(2) and 5(2) of Regu-
lation No. 17.
It is obvious that exclusive dealer or distributor agreements per-
form an economic function and have long been a normal way of organ-
izing distribution and marketing of goods. Introduction of a new
product in the Common Market does require the appointment of dis-
tributors who are willing to make the investment and effort to place
the product on the market and develop sales for it by organizing chan-
nels of distribution and outlets, hiring a sales force, acquiring distri-
bution equipment, developing publicity and advertising campaigns
and, often, providing servicing facilities. An exclusive franchise has
been the normal reward for willingness to invest, expend and develop
proper efforts. Often this is the only practical way for a small manu-
facturer to introduce a new product in competition with an established
line of a large manufacturer who, through his economic power, may
dominate the market for a particular type of product. To strike down
exclusive distributor agreements in such cases is to strike down small
business and increase concentration of economic power.
Even with regard to large enterprises, the exclusive distributor
agreement permits the development of small business. If the large
manufacturer cannot control the marketing of his goods through inde-
pendent distributors to obtain intensive distribution and competition
against other brands, he will have no alternative but to take over
distribution at all levels.
On the other hand, it is true that in some cases exclusive distribu-
tor agreements may insulate the distributors from competition among
themselves and may distort the natural patterns of distribution, not
only of the particular product but also of other product lines. They
may also indirectly bring about price-fixing and differentiation of prices
within the Common Market which may affect the Common Market's
objective for a price-stabilization policy.
The question is whether a solution may be found in eliminating
closed territories in the Common Market by permitting exclusivity,
in the sense only of primary responsibility and primary organization
of distribution in a Member State, so that distributors in one State
may not invade the territory of another distributor but may be re-
quired to sell to willing purchasers from another State and may have
no power to stop importation from another State which is not know-
ingly organized or encouraged by another distributor.
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Even though no separate Regulation is issued by the Council on
exclusive distributor agreements, the Commission should be willing
to exempt under article 85(3) arrangements which do not, in fact,
substantially affect trade between Member States.
CONCLUSIONS
No attempt has been made here to discuss the procedure before
the Commission, such as hearings, process of investigation, rights of
defense, the role of the Consultative C6mmittee, appeals before the
court, imposition of fines and penalties, and the like. These relate to
a general study of the Regulations and exceed the limited scope of
this paper which is concerned primarily with the impact of the Treaty
and Regulations on industrial property.
A comment may be made on the fact that the basic requirement
of notification of agreements under Regulation No. 17 provokes a
sense of irritation on the part of Americans. Our tradition of not
requiring the filing of agreements with any government bodies is a
fundamental one expressing our philosophy of antitrust regulation.
But European countries, by and large, are committed to a philosophy
of registration of agreements restricting competition. This is moti-
vated by the view that the publicity attendant to registration tends
to keep antitrust abuses in check, and also by a greater confidence
than we have in the adequacy of quasi-executive or informal adminis-
trative handling of antitrust conflicts in preference to involvement in
costly and protracted antitrust proceedings of the American pattern.
In addition, there are few European experts in antitrust law with prac-
tical experience and there is a tendency in governmental bodies to look
to economists rather than to lawyers for expert advice in this new field.
Quite a number of the officials of the Directorate-General of
Competition of the Commission of the EEC are Germans, usually with
experience in the German Cartel Office. Since the only law in the Com-
mon Market countries similar to the principles of articles 85 and 86 is
the German law, it is natural that officials of the Commission are likely
to be inspired by German thinking on antitrust law. This should be
helpful in two respects: it may afford a basic legal background to draw
upon in coming to grips with the principles of the Treaty and their im-
plementation under Regulation No. 17; and it may insure a procedure
and mode of application inspired by informal discussion and efforts
at persuasion, which is the established practice under the West German
Law Against Restraints of Competition of 1957.
This does not mean, of course, that the decisions or attitude of
the German Cartel Office on agreements will have a controlling effect,
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or even a sure guidance, on the decisions or attitude of the Commission
in interpreting and applying the Treaty and the Regulation. As seen
from the above analysis, the provisions of the Treaty do not conform
to the German Act, and furthermore, the basic objectives of com-
petitive freedom within a single State and within the Common Market
may not lead to the same conclusions.
It is believed that the principles established by articles 85 and
86 of the Treaty are flexible and reasonable and the Commission and
the Court of Justice are free to mold these plastic principles to the
economic needs of the Common Market. It is economic motives that
dominated the stipulations of the Treaty and these, it is believed, will
determine the attitude of the Common Market authorities in their
enforcement.
The writer also believes that the Commission will be slow in mov-
ing to imposition of fines and penalties in enforcing intentional or
negligent violation of the Treaty prohibitions with respect, particu-
larly, to agreements relating to industrial property. He believes that
the Commission will make ample use of the powers given to it by
article 7 of Regulation No. 17 to obtain voluntary elimination of ob-
jectionable restrictions and abandonment of questionable practices.
The role of the Consultative Committee, whose advice the Commission
must seek in the interpretation of the Treaty, is an uncertain factor,
but it does mean that the Commission will not ignore the views of the
Member States on the economic needs of the Common Market which
are to be served.
It is still too early to forecast how the Common Market law will
evolve, particularly with respect to the tests of reasonableness under
article 85(3). In any case, this law is here to stay and it will develop
mature jurisprudence just as such law has evolved under our statutes.
The Court of Justice, which has already given evidence of high excel-
lence, will have to do a pioneer work. Those of the officials of the
Directorate of Competition in the Commission of the Common Market
whom the writer has met give every evidence of being skilled and
intelligent men, anxious to do well and dedicated Europeans. The
only question is whether the Directorate has enough of them to accom-
plish the tremendous task before the Commission.
The duty of business enterprises is to help the development of
a sound law by notifying their agreements and otherwise cooperating
with the Commission, so that it may have a complete picture of the
economic facts as disclosed by agreements and practices, and of their
motivations and results. It is only by doing so that business will
enable the Commission to apply the rule of reason to the dynamic
economy arising in the Common Market.
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